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Abstract: This article aims to show us the relation between the multilevel governance and the 
subsidiarity principle. The new provisions of the Lisbon Treaty will strengthen the democratic accountability of 
the EU and its institutions by creating new tools of communication and political dialogue. The early warning 
mechanism can also be used as a tool for a better consultation in order to identify specific concerns and 
expectations of the citizens or local and regional authorities. 
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The relationship between the MLG and the subsidiarity principle involves several viewpoints. For 
instance, Nicolas Levrat considers that MLG is accompanied, not without paradoxes, by a progressive 
institutionalisation combined with an amazing marriage with the subsidiarity principle. Moreover, the declension 
and enforcement of this governance could relaunch a positive institutional dynamics that, after endless 
equivocations relating to the difficulties of the treaties‟ reform, would place the latest European institution – the 
Committee of the Regions – at the core of the integration process through an original institutional partnership 
proposal with the Commission (Levrat, N, 2009). 
Simone Piattini considers that MLG is a method, a process – or, according to the CoR, “the” method 
and process – for deciding and implementing shared and efficient EU policies. It is in this context that the 
WPMG offers a novel interpretation of subsidiarity as partnership in the MLG space (Piattoni, 2009). 
 
1. MLG and a novel interpretation of subsidiarity by the White Paper on MLG 
 
Since the Treaty of Maastricht (TUE), the concept of subsidiarity is defined as a regulating principle of 
EU – Member States mixed competences (Barbulescu, I. Gh., 2008: 140). This principle allows the Community 
to legitimate its powers and the states and regions to “defend themselves from excessive and/or untimely 
incursions of the Community” (Barbulescu, I. Gh., 2008: 140; Constantinesco, V. 1991a). As this principle has 
been enforced, it has acquired a fundamental ambiguity: far from being a univocal concept, it is rather an 
“inherently contested” concept. Each tier of government, and even non-governmental actors, interpret it to suit 
their own agenda. To Member States, subsidiarity means that the Union should tackle only those issues which 
the Members States cannot effectively handle themselves to local and regional authorities. It means that action 
should be taken at the closest possible level to the ultimate receivers of the policy, that is, at the local and 
regional level; to non-governmental organisations, subsidiarity means that the state, at whatever level, should 
avoid meddling with issues that society can handle on its own. The concept has been, in other words, a political 
tug-of-war: a restatement of the disagreement over which actors are legitimated to decide over which issues. The 
WPMG puts an end to this debate and establishes that subsidiarity implies that all these levels and actors should 
be simultaneously involved and establishes a de facto correspondence between subsidiarity and partnership. The 
CoR appears so committed to this new understanding of subsidiarity that it is joining forces with the Council of 
Europe in order to promote a “pan-European consensus on [this understanding of] multilevel governance” 
(Piattoni, 2009). 
In the opinion of Anna Augustyn, MLG is a mechanism that operates more effectively while being 
connected with the subsidiarity principle (linking responsibilities of different actors with the characteristic of 
their interaction). I interpret this principle as the way of decision making that happens "as closely as possible to a 
citizen" (Lisbon Treaty). In case there would be a problem that could not be solved in an immediate environment 
(level) of a citizen, other environments (levels) are more appropriate to undertake steps in this direction. The 
decision which actor at which level in a multilevel governance setting could be responsible for problem solving 
should depend on assessment of possible changes to be caused by intervention/interventions available 
(considering such aspects like problem solving capacity, performance, effectiveness, cost-benefit, etc.). 
Obviously, the need for a more detailed assessment is related with the nature of certain problems: 
"Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall 
act only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States, either at central level or at regional and local levels, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the 
proposed action, be better achieved at Union level" (Lisbon Treaty, Art. 5.3). Most of the articles mentioning the 
subsidiarity principle within the Treaty refer therefore to the "check" whether decision/lawmaking within 
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different authorities respects this. The White Paper adds some points to this, especially while mentioning the role 
of the CoR as a facilitator and subsidiarity watch-dog in multi-level governance setting. 
Taking into account the interpretations of the subsidiarity principle resulting from the Union's law, its 
basic applications have referred to dividing the responsibility for problem-solving between the Community and 
the Member States. Moreover, from the perspective of the Lisbon Treaty, the need for subsidiarity occurs 
primarily in the law-making context. Thanks to multilevel governance and the White Paper, the principle is 
being placed in a wider context and more explicitly meaning involvement of other actors (situated within vertical 
and horizontal levels) into this process. It underlies the need for an increasing responsibility of regional and local 
authorities as well as civil society and replacing the "division of powers" by partnership. If appropriate, 
responsibility may be shared between actors and result in forming structures transcending simple sectoral or 
territorial dimensions (e.g. National Networks of Rural Areas) (Augustyn, 2009). 
 
2. MLG and the increased role given to the national and sub-national actors in implementing the 
subsidiarity principle 
 
The new provisions of the Lisbon Treaty will strengthen the democratic accountability of the EU and its 
institutions by creating new tools of communication and political dialogue. A main contribution is the 
opportunity to bring the European themes and policies within more dynamic framework of internal debates. This 
will add legitimacy to interests and preferences of each state from a perspective closer to the citizens. The overall 
impact will definitely improve the decision-making processes and will ensure a greater transparency and 
openness of EU activities. Specific consultation procedures can allow the civil society, the local and regional 
authorities (Mesclier, F. 2007: 72). And other interested parties to get involved and express their positions and 
expectations by using the relationships with the members of the national parliaments. As representative, any 
member of the parliament can gather those opinions and associate them in relation with the Commission 
proposals. 
The early warning mechanism can also be used as a tool for a better consultation in order to identify 
specific concerns and expectations of the citizens or local and regional authorities. Arguments and opinions can 
be gathered and used in order to identify better practices or to simplify certain actions. To this end, the initiative 
of Subsidiarity Monitoring Network shall be promoted as much as possible. 
There might be a challenge that a specific proposal can have different interpretations within the national 
parliaments, based on the differentiation of constitutional order (unitary states versus federal states) with regard 
to the efficiency of the implementation. Also, there is a risk that some proposals might become reasons for 
political disputes among different parties, without taking into account the European dimension and implication 
of a specific proposal (IERS/Dolghi, D. 2009: 30-31). 
The Lisbon Treaty brings the EU a step forward in the safeguarding of subsidiarity. The increased role 
given to the national parliaments in the monitoring of subsidiarity is a positive development. However there is 
more to be done. The early warning mechanism could work in decentralised countries with bicameral legislature 
or regional assemblies (although the role of the latter is rather limited); however in more centralised Member 
States the level closer to the citizen will have to be the national. Concerns about subsidiarity which arise at the 
regional and local level cannot thus be expressed, especially in the absence of legislative houses consisting of 
representatives of the regions. This causes an imbalance and could allow unequal enforcement of the principle of 
subsidiarity among Member States. A possible way to redress that would be to take recourse to the subsidiarity 
monitoring mechanism of the Committee of the Regions or in fact assign a more muscular role to the Committee 
of the Regions in the monitoring of subsidiarity (Antonopoulos, E. 2009). 
The greater weight of the parliamentary component in the EU decision-making system as provided for 
in the Lisbon Treaty particularly concerns the role of the national parliaments in monitoring the implementation 
of the subsidiarity principle. In this respect, the regional parliaments in the individual Member States should 
become more important (Hrbek, R. 2009). 
According to Paulo Ponzano, the participation of national parliaments to the European decision-making 
process is an action meant to provide control over the enforcement of the subsidiarity principle (Ponzano, 2009), 
which shows the way in which the MLG actually functions within the European Union. 
The already established participation of regional authorities in the configuration of the Council of the 
EU is a relevant instrument and recently approved Treaty of Lisbon – Protocol 2 on the application of the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality – goes in the right direction reinforcing the participation (Beltran, 
S., Noferini, A. 2009: 4). 
According to Paul Furlong “paradoxically, there is a danger of a „one size fits all‟ approach to 
subsidiarity; it cannot be imposed from central organisations, therefore it has to grow at the local and regional 
level Central EU monitoring is not the way forward. Also, the political issues are difficult. Notwithstanding the 
weight of EU legislation in the framing of national legislative output, the most difficult interface is between the 
national governments and their local/regional counterparts. This is not a relationship into which the CoR can (or 
should) readily interpose itself. Subsidiarity is best seen as a matter therefore for Member States primarily” 
(Furlong, P. 2009). 
The status of the principle of subsidiarity has been reinforced in the recent treaty amendments, but this 
is only one side of the coin. Regional and local authorities not only want to defend themselves, but, first and 
foremost, want to participate in this intertwined world. They have solid arguments for doing so, referring to the 
emerging reality of participation in so many policy fields and to numerous new initiatives (Loughlin 2007).  
The White Paper on MLG, drafted by the Committee of the Regions, can therefore build on the experience 
of the sub-national actors and argue in favour of their systematic participation in all phases of the policy-making 
process, from the conceptualization to the implementation (Delmartino, 2009). 
Summarizing, if the principle of subsidiarity has provided an institutional guarantee to each public actor 
with regard to its „core business‟, MLG has offered a scheme of reference for positioning public and private 
actors vis-à-vis their crucial role of interacting agents across multiple levels of governance (Delmartino, 2009). 
The possibility of fostering the principles of subsidiarity and of variable geometry to governance, 
translating them into rules allows the virtuous coexistence of various models of governance. This could lead to 
find first-best solutions for each and every country, as well as for territorial aggregations that might arise case 
per case, while facing specific goals. The adoption of shared rules is necessary. It will be up to these rules to 
determine rights, duties and freedom, as the success of MLG as a concrete tool of European Governments (Velo, 
F., 2009). 
 
3. Using the MLG, CoR becomes the master of subsidiarity 
 
The subsidiarity principle has been among the political priorities respecting of the CoR, but it has never 
had the opportunity to prove it from a legal point of view. It has always reclaimed this anomaly and requested to 
respectfully protect subsidiarity (Theleen, J. 2009:32). The Lisbon Treaty provides that the CoR can directly 
inform the Court of Justice for an appeal against violating the subsidiarity principle, particularly in the case of 
some legislative acts for whose adoption it has to be consulted compulsorily. 
 Also, another expected result may also be a longer period of time (more than 8 weeks) in which the law 
propositions are analyzed and amended. A solution would be a well designed e-network that could collect the 
data and summarize it. This network could be the already existing CoR network which will have to change in 
accordance to the principle of participation in the decision-making structures of the EU, of each Member State.  
As we have seen before, the MLG is based on the subsidiarity principle. Considering that subsidiarity 
distributes power on different levels for amendment and that coherence between the competences needed for 
managing a policy, there is a need for political interaction at different levels. Since 2007, the CoR has 
established the Subsidiarity Monitoring Network aiming at concerting and coordinating data referring to the 
control of subsidiarity principle. This network also aims at facilitating the exchange of information between the 
EU local and regional communities and the European level relating to different political documents and 
legislative proposals of the European Commission (Theleen, J. 2009: 33). 
From this perspective, the CoR is an expertise body, which allows it to be alert and contribute to 
improving the European legislation. From this perspective, Nicolas Levrat points out that “CoR, by a skilful 
combination of new requirements requesting the Commission to expand the Lisbon Treaty with the subsidiarity 
principle to local and regional dimensions on the one hand and to resume the governance principles developed 
by the Commission in its White Charter 2001 on the other hand, makes a detailed proposal to the European 
Commission for a new original partnership” (Levrat, N, 2009). This partnership would belong to the community 
initiative (Barbulescu, I. Gh., 2008: 353). The same Nicolas Levrat notices that “the elaboration of a White 
Charter by the Committee of the Regions (when this has been practised only by the Commission so far in a 
community context) is far from being safe” (Levrat, N, 2009).  The new partnership is to be based on 
cooperation in monitoring the subsidiarity principle and assessment of the territorial impact of community 
policies, in one word the impact in MLG. The assessment of the community policies‟ impact on the MLG once 
the Lisbon Treaty enters into force becomes one of the subsidiarity elements. 
In conclusion to the second part of the paper, we can say the following: 
First of all, the subsidiarity principle is part of the multilevel governance. The trend is towards 
„dynamic subsidiarity‟, understood as collaboration between different levels of governance in which each 
participant unit contributes its distinctive expertise and resources to resolve the common problems.  
Secondly, according to the subsidiarity principle, the political arenas could easily stay interconnected 
rather than nested, as stated by a major thesis of the multilevel governance paradigm. In this way, the sub-
national actors are allowed to operate simultaneously in both national and supranational arenas without being 
restricted only to the horizontal level. 
Finally, subsidiarity considered through the Lisbon Treaty seems to allow CoR become a genuine 
community institution, which seems to be a paradox considering that it has been conceived to prevent 
community institutions from blocking the competences of the Member States. Yet the reading of the White 
Paper on MLG protects CoR from such a perspective and its subsidiarity cannot be accused of having led to 
institutionally strengthening the European Union to the detriment of national and sub-national stakeholders. 
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